[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.In the battle for American opinion, Begin now had to play to the gallery as well, presenting himself in a softer light.“Never mind the Nobel Peace,” exclaimed the former Israeli premier Golda Meir,“give them both Oscars.”31Sadat’s two days in Israel personalized the peace process and gave it a momentum of its own.“Egypt and Israel became hostage toeach other,” notes one of Begin’s biographers.“The failure of the peace process was liable to inflict heavy damage on one, or both, of them.”32 Although Sadat was taking greater risks—threatened with isolation in the Arab world—Begin had been sucked into the spiral of soaring expectations.Yet neither leader had shifted his central positions.In Sadat’s historic address to the Knesset on November 20 he spoke movingly of his passion for peace—“any life that is lost in war is a human life, be it that of an Arab or an Israeli”—and of the need to break through the “psychological barrier” of mutual suspicion that he described as“seventy percent of the whole problem.” But, to the anger of Begin and his Cabinet, he called unyieldingly for withdrawal from all “the Arab territories occupied in 1967,” including East Jerusalem, and recognition of the “fundamental rights of the Palestinian people,”including “the right to establish their own state.”These must be an integral part of any agreement: there could be no separate peace 298reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 299cam p dav i d 197 8between Egypt and Israel.Responding, Begin expressed his desire for “real peace with complete reconciliation between the Jews and the Arab peoples” and proposed that “everything be open to negotiation.”Yet most of his speech set out the lessons of the Holocaust and the war for independence in 1948 for “this generation of ex-termination” who had pledged “we would never again put ourpeople in danger.”33On December 25, 1977, Begin paid a return visit to Egypt, where he and Sadat conferred in Ismailia on the Suez Canal.Begin proposed a phased military withdrawal from Sinai, but insisted that the Jewish settlements must remain.He also offered a plan for self-rule for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, allowing them to elect an administrative council with limited powers.Although the issue of sovereignty was left vague in the plan, it became clear that Begin did not intend to relinquish control or to concede the applicability of UN Resolution 242.Sadat, who seems to have expected that bybreaching the “psychological barrier” he would elicit dramatic Israeli concessions, was bitterly disappointed.34 At Ismailia he agreed that two committees—one military, the other political—should explore the issues at stake but he rejected virtually all Begin’s substantive proposals.“I cannot agree to surrender a single inch of Arab land.It is sacred,” he exclaimed.“Mr.President,” Begin retorted, “I cannot give up a single inch of Eretz Yisrael.It is sacred.”35For Carter the dramatic events of late 1977 redrew the parame-ters of his Middle Eastern diplomacy.The Americans had been informed but not consulted about Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, which seemed for a while to push them to the sidelines.And Begin’s autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza, despite its manifest inadequacies for the Egyptians and Americans, became the documenton the table.Brzezinski in particular thought it might prove the basis for transitional arrangements acceptable to all parties.36The idea of reconvening the Geneva conference under Ameri-can-Soviet aegis was also dropped: the best prospects obviously lay now in direct talks between Egypt and Israel.But the Ismailia talks were hardly encouraging.On January 18, 1978, the first meeting of the new political committee, held in Jerusalem, broke down when 299reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 300sum m i t sSadat ordered the Egyptian delegates back to Cairo, complaining bitterly that Begin wanted land rather than peace.It became clear that the two leaders were not willing or at least not able to achieve a radical breakthrough on their own.And so the White House resorted to summitry [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.In the battle for American opinion, Begin now had to play to the gallery as well, presenting himself in a softer light.“Never mind the Nobel Peace,” exclaimed the former Israeli premier Golda Meir,“give them both Oscars.”31Sadat’s two days in Israel personalized the peace process and gave it a momentum of its own.“Egypt and Israel became hostage toeach other,” notes one of Begin’s biographers.“The failure of the peace process was liable to inflict heavy damage on one, or both, of them.”32 Although Sadat was taking greater risks—threatened with isolation in the Arab world—Begin had been sucked into the spiral of soaring expectations.Yet neither leader had shifted his central positions.In Sadat’s historic address to the Knesset on November 20 he spoke movingly of his passion for peace—“any life that is lost in war is a human life, be it that of an Arab or an Israeli”—and of the need to break through the “psychological barrier” of mutual suspicion that he described as“seventy percent of the whole problem.” But, to the anger of Begin and his Cabinet, he called unyieldingly for withdrawal from all “the Arab territories occupied in 1967,” including East Jerusalem, and recognition of the “fundamental rights of the Palestinian people,”including “the right to establish their own state.”These must be an integral part of any agreement: there could be no separate peace 298reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 299cam p dav i d 197 8between Egypt and Israel.Responding, Begin expressed his desire for “real peace with complete reconciliation between the Jews and the Arab peoples” and proposed that “everything be open to negotiation.”Yet most of his speech set out the lessons of the Holocaust and the war for independence in 1948 for “this generation of ex-termination” who had pledged “we would never again put ourpeople in danger.”33On December 25, 1977, Begin paid a return visit to Egypt, where he and Sadat conferred in Ismailia on the Suez Canal.Begin proposed a phased military withdrawal from Sinai, but insisted that the Jewish settlements must remain.He also offered a plan for self-rule for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, allowing them to elect an administrative council with limited powers.Although the issue of sovereignty was left vague in the plan, it became clear that Begin did not intend to relinquish control or to concede the applicability of UN Resolution 242.Sadat, who seems to have expected that bybreaching the “psychological barrier” he would elicit dramatic Israeli concessions, was bitterly disappointed.34 At Ismailia he agreed that two committees—one military, the other political—should explore the issues at stake but he rejected virtually all Begin’s substantive proposals.“I cannot agree to surrender a single inch of Arab land.It is sacred,” he exclaimed.“Mr.President,” Begin retorted, “I cannot give up a single inch of Eretz Yisrael.It is sacred.”35For Carter the dramatic events of late 1977 redrew the parame-ters of his Middle Eastern diplomacy.The Americans had been informed but not consulted about Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, which seemed for a while to push them to the sidelines.And Begin’s autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza, despite its manifest inadequacies for the Egyptians and Americans, became the documenton the table.Brzezinski in particular thought it might prove the basis for transitional arrangements acceptable to all parties.36The idea of reconvening the Geneva conference under Ameri-can-Soviet aegis was also dropped: the best prospects obviously lay now in direct talks between Egypt and Israel.But the Ismailia talks were hardly encouraging.On January 18, 1978, the first meeting of the new political committee, held in Jerusalem, broke down when 299reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 300sum m i t sSadat ordered the Egyptian delegates back to Cairo, complaining bitterly that Begin wanted land rather than peace.It became clear that the two leaders were not willing or at least not able to achieve a radical breakthrough on their own.And so the White House resorted to summitry [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]