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.Polls early in the monthshowed him with a 74 percent approval rating and a 77 to 18 percent margin over Goldwater in a trial election.As important to Lyndon, polls beganto show that none of the vice-presidential candidates would do anything tostrengthen his candidacy.Yet Johnson couldn t just put Kennedy to one side.So, he now developed a plan to eliminate Kennedy from the running.Johnson put out astatement declaring that no one in the Cabinet or who met with the Cabinet, meaning Adlai Stevenson and Sargent Shriver, would be consideredfor the vice presidency.It would be too great a distraction from runningtheir respective departments.An end to Bobby s candidacy freed Johnson to encourage speculationabout the vice-presidential nominee.It was a way to baffle reporters, getthem writing about Johnson s problem in choosing a Vice President, andstir public interest in what would happen at the Democratic conventionbeginning on August 24.But before he got to the convention and subsequent campaign, Johnson felt compelled to answer doubts about Vietnam.:: the tonkin gulf resolutionBy June 1964 Vietnam had become a constant low-level irritant to Johnson.At home, the public and many in the Congress seemed indifferent or bewildered by the war; a few senators cautioned against deeper involvement; and 176 :: lyndon b.johnsonBarry Goldwater complained about the administration s weak response tothe Communist challenge.In Vietnam itself there was no immediateprospect of a stable regime capable of resisting attacks without continuingand probably greater U.S.military and economic support.Johnson s preference in the middle of June was to put the problem onhold until after the November election.He had no intention of letting Vietnam go, but he hoped for a respite from politically distracting decisions during the campaign.Yet, however much Johnson wished to deemphasize the issue, Vietnamwas not a problem that would even temporarily go away.If, for example,the North Vietnamese thought his administration was immobilized duringthe presidential campaign, Johnson believed it could mean the demise ofSouth Vietnam.Nor did he dare risk having American voters view him asineffective in dealing with the Communist threat.On June 12, Johnson made clear that he had no intention of leaving orexpanding the war in Vietnam.He seized upon a visit by Germany s Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to announce their mutual opposition to Hanoi saggression against Saigon and determination to support the South Vietnamese against the Viet Cong.In the first half of July, Johnson considered making a nationally televisedtalk on Vietnam that, in Bill Moyer s words, could defuse a Goldwaterbomb before he ever gets the chance to throw it. At the same time Johnson worried about meeting a Goldwater challenge to his Vietnam policy,General Khanh in Saigon pressed him to step up efforts against Hanoi orto go north. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor was so fearful of a Khanh resignation and South Vietnamese overtures to the Communists for a negotiated settlement that he proposed joint contingencyplanning for bombing North Vietnam.Taylor also asked for several thousand additional military advisers, which Johnson agreed to send.By the end of July, Johnson was eager to bolster South Vietnamesemorale, put Hanoi on additional notice of U.S.determination to stand fast,and deprive the Republicans of any advantage they hoped to gain fromVietnam in the campaign.To help advance the first two goals, the administration increased secret military efforts known as Operation 34-A, raids onthe coast of North Vietnam by South Vietnamese commandos and U.S.advisers, and DE SOTO patrols by U.S.destroyers gathering electronic andother military intelligence and making a show of force to Hanoi.During the night and early morning of July 30 31, a 34-A operation tookplace against two North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin.The following day the USS Maddox, an American destroyer, began a DE SOTO Landslide Lyndon :: 177patrol in the same area.On Sunday morning, August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the Maddox in international waters sixteenmiles from the coast.The Maddox, supported by planes from an aircraftcarrier, hit back, sinking one and damaging another of the North Vietnamese boats.George Ball and Senator J.William Fulbright later said that the steppedup operations in July and August were meant to provoke Hanoi into aresponse that would allow the United States to begin air attacks on NorthVietnam.Fulbright, in fact, held this view at the time of the attack.In atelephone conversation on the morning of August 3, Fulbright told Ballthat he was a little suspicious and thought probably that the incident wasasked for. But McNamara and Bundy dispute that.MacNamara told his biographerDeborah Shapley: I don t believe that the president, or I, or Dean Rusk, orMac Bundy were planning, in the sense of anticipating or embarking upon overt war with North Vietnam in 1964.I know that the president didn tintend overt war and I didn t intend overt war in 1964.Johnson didn t haveplans for military action other than to continue on as we were. Likewise,Bundy told Shapley, Johnson didn t want to take decisions on this issue inan election year [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Polls early in the monthshowed him with a 74 percent approval rating and a 77 to 18 percent margin over Goldwater in a trial election.As important to Lyndon, polls beganto show that none of the vice-presidential candidates would do anything tostrengthen his candidacy.Yet Johnson couldn t just put Kennedy to one side.So, he now developed a plan to eliminate Kennedy from the running.Johnson put out astatement declaring that no one in the Cabinet or who met with the Cabinet, meaning Adlai Stevenson and Sargent Shriver, would be consideredfor the vice presidency.It would be too great a distraction from runningtheir respective departments.An end to Bobby s candidacy freed Johnson to encourage speculationabout the vice-presidential nominee.It was a way to baffle reporters, getthem writing about Johnson s problem in choosing a Vice President, andstir public interest in what would happen at the Democratic conventionbeginning on August 24.But before he got to the convention and subsequent campaign, Johnson felt compelled to answer doubts about Vietnam.:: the tonkin gulf resolutionBy June 1964 Vietnam had become a constant low-level irritant to Johnson.At home, the public and many in the Congress seemed indifferent or bewildered by the war; a few senators cautioned against deeper involvement; and 176 :: lyndon b.johnsonBarry Goldwater complained about the administration s weak response tothe Communist challenge.In Vietnam itself there was no immediateprospect of a stable regime capable of resisting attacks without continuingand probably greater U.S.military and economic support.Johnson s preference in the middle of June was to put the problem onhold until after the November election.He had no intention of letting Vietnam go, but he hoped for a respite from politically distracting decisions during the campaign.Yet, however much Johnson wished to deemphasize the issue, Vietnamwas not a problem that would even temporarily go away.If, for example,the North Vietnamese thought his administration was immobilized duringthe presidential campaign, Johnson believed it could mean the demise ofSouth Vietnam.Nor did he dare risk having American voters view him asineffective in dealing with the Communist threat.On June 12, Johnson made clear that he had no intention of leaving orexpanding the war in Vietnam.He seized upon a visit by Germany s Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to announce their mutual opposition to Hanoi saggression against Saigon and determination to support the South Vietnamese against the Viet Cong.In the first half of July, Johnson considered making a nationally televisedtalk on Vietnam that, in Bill Moyer s words, could defuse a Goldwaterbomb before he ever gets the chance to throw it. At the same time Johnson worried about meeting a Goldwater challenge to his Vietnam policy,General Khanh in Saigon pressed him to step up efforts against Hanoi orto go north. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor was so fearful of a Khanh resignation and South Vietnamese overtures to the Communists for a negotiated settlement that he proposed joint contingencyplanning for bombing North Vietnam.Taylor also asked for several thousand additional military advisers, which Johnson agreed to send.By the end of July, Johnson was eager to bolster South Vietnamesemorale, put Hanoi on additional notice of U.S.determination to stand fast,and deprive the Republicans of any advantage they hoped to gain fromVietnam in the campaign.To help advance the first two goals, the administration increased secret military efforts known as Operation 34-A, raids onthe coast of North Vietnam by South Vietnamese commandos and U.S.advisers, and DE SOTO patrols by U.S.destroyers gathering electronic andother military intelligence and making a show of force to Hanoi.During the night and early morning of July 30 31, a 34-A operation tookplace against two North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin.The following day the USS Maddox, an American destroyer, began a DE SOTO Landslide Lyndon :: 177patrol in the same area.On Sunday morning, August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the Maddox in international waters sixteenmiles from the coast.The Maddox, supported by planes from an aircraftcarrier, hit back, sinking one and damaging another of the North Vietnamese boats.George Ball and Senator J.William Fulbright later said that the steppedup operations in July and August were meant to provoke Hanoi into aresponse that would allow the United States to begin air attacks on NorthVietnam.Fulbright, in fact, held this view at the time of the attack.In atelephone conversation on the morning of August 3, Fulbright told Ballthat he was a little suspicious and thought probably that the incident wasasked for. But McNamara and Bundy dispute that.MacNamara told his biographerDeborah Shapley: I don t believe that the president, or I, or Dean Rusk, orMac Bundy were planning, in the sense of anticipating or embarking upon overt war with North Vietnam in 1964.I know that the president didn tintend overt war and I didn t intend overt war in 1964.Johnson didn t haveplans for military action other than to continue on as we were. Likewise,Bundy told Shapley, Johnson didn t want to take decisions on this issue inan election year [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]