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.Its forty-person unit operated twenty-four hours per day collecting information to the extent that the FBI, CIA, andthe State Department shared their intelligence with it.These agencies gave outonly general information.The FAA had a no-fly list, but none of the September11 hijackers were on it.In fact, the list had less than twenty names on it.TheCIA had a list of suspected terrorists, but it was not shared with the FAA becausethe list was classified.Although the State Department had a watch list with61,000 names on it, neither the FAA nor the airlines had access to the list.Whatis more significant is that the FAA did not want or ask for access to the watch listbecause the airlines would have been unwilling to check it because of cost andtime constraints.The FAA was completely unaware of any hijacking plots, but civil aviationsecurity officials knew about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda s interest in plotsaimed at civil aviation.They had intelligence dating from the 1990s that al-Qaedaaffiliates were interested in hijackings and the possible use of aircraft as a weapon.Moreover, FAA intelligence analysts were aware of the increased intelligence 104 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)activity forecasting possible terrorist acts in the summer of 2001.The FAA issueda series of alerts to air carriers about possible terrorist activity directed toward civilaviation operations.However, most of the FAA s concern was related to explo-sives being smuggled into aircraft.This had also been the main area of focus forthe Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, also known as the Gore Com-mission, which President Clinton had authorized in 1996.That commission hadbeen reluctant, however, to assume the role and duties of screening airport pas-sengers and luggage because it would have meant hiring 50,000 new federalemployees at a cost of several billion dollars at a time when the Clinton adminis-tration and Congress were busy cutting the number of federal employees and thefederal budget.Federal Aviation Administration starts its check on airline passengers with aprocess known as prescreening.Passenger prescreening begins with the ticketingprocess and concludes with the passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter.Prescreening occurs when passenger names are checked against the FAA s list ofindividuals known to pose a threat to commercial aviation.On September 11,2001, there were only twelve names on the list, and none of the names of the9/11 hijackers were on it.This meant that none of the 9/11 hijackers were sub-jected to extra security measures at the airport.The hijackers did have to gothrough the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program (CAPPS) forexamination of luggage for explosives.They all passed the CAPPS inspectionbecause explosives were not part of their plot.The checkpoint screening system failed miserably on September 11, 2001.Numerous studies had noted various weaknesses in the checkpoint screeningsystem.The FAA had attempted since 1996 to set certification requirements forscreening contractors, but these requirements had not been implemented bySeptember 11, 2001.Counteracting these security efforts were FAA s instruc-tions to checkpoint supervisors to use common sense about what items shouldnot be allowed on an aircraft. This loose definition of what was allowed cre-ated confusion among the screeners.Among the items that the nineteen hijack-ers carried through thecheckpoint system were chemi-Lack of Attention to FAA s Intelligence Unit bycal sprays, utility knives, andFAA Senior Managementbox cutters.Even though util-ity knives were permissibleMoreover, the FAA s intelligence unit did not receiveunder FAA regulations, boxmuch attention from the agency s leadership.Neithercutters and chemical spraysAdministrator Jane Garvey nor her deputy routinelywere not.Several of the hijack-reviewed daily intelligence, and what they did see wasers set off alarms at securityscreened for them.She was unaware of a great amount ofcheckpoints; however, all ofhijacking threat information from her own intelligenceunit, which, in turn, was not deeply involved in the them were allowed to boardagency s policymaking process.Historically, decisive secu-their planes.rity action took place only after a disaster had occurred orTwo of the hijacked airlinersa specific plot had been discovered.had departed from LoganInternational Airport.LoganThe 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Com-International Airport had longmission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York:been known as one of the leastNorton, 2005), p.83.secure airports in the United Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 105States.As the eighteenth busiest airport in the country, it had the fifth-highestnumber of security breaches from 1991 to 2000.The Massachusetts PortAuthority (Massport) ran the airport and it had more security violations than anyother airport authority in the United States.All of this was well-known beforeSeptember 11, but nothing was done to rectify the situation.Even an April 2001memorandum from Massport s Director of Security, Joe Lawless, on the needfor Logan International Airport to address its known security vulnerabilities wasignored.Lawless had been a career law enforcement officer, who had worked asa state trooper and then provided security for former Massachusetts GovernorWilliam F.Weld.He had tried to institute mandatory criminal backgroundchecks on airline employees and subcontractors after discovering that the airlinechecks had failed to detect the criminal records of some employees.His rewardfor trying to improve security was to become a designated scapegoat for whathappened at Logan International Airport on September 11, and he was subse-quently demoted to a lower-level job.Once the 9/11 terrorists had passed through the screening process andboarded, there were no impediments to a successful hijacking [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Its forty-person unit operated twenty-four hours per day collecting information to the extent that the FBI, CIA, andthe State Department shared their intelligence with it.These agencies gave outonly general information.The FAA had a no-fly list, but none of the September11 hijackers were on it.In fact, the list had less than twenty names on it.TheCIA had a list of suspected terrorists, but it was not shared with the FAA becausethe list was classified.Although the State Department had a watch list with61,000 names on it, neither the FAA nor the airlines had access to the list.Whatis more significant is that the FAA did not want or ask for access to the watch listbecause the airlines would have been unwilling to check it because of cost andtime constraints.The FAA was completely unaware of any hijacking plots, but civil aviationsecurity officials knew about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda s interest in plotsaimed at civil aviation.They had intelligence dating from the 1990s that al-Qaedaaffiliates were interested in hijackings and the possible use of aircraft as a weapon.Moreover, FAA intelligence analysts were aware of the increased intelligence 104 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)activity forecasting possible terrorist acts in the summer of 2001.The FAA issueda series of alerts to air carriers about possible terrorist activity directed toward civilaviation operations.However, most of the FAA s concern was related to explo-sives being smuggled into aircraft.This had also been the main area of focus forthe Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, also known as the Gore Com-mission, which President Clinton had authorized in 1996.That commission hadbeen reluctant, however, to assume the role and duties of screening airport pas-sengers and luggage because it would have meant hiring 50,000 new federalemployees at a cost of several billion dollars at a time when the Clinton adminis-tration and Congress were busy cutting the number of federal employees and thefederal budget.Federal Aviation Administration starts its check on airline passengers with aprocess known as prescreening.Passenger prescreening begins with the ticketingprocess and concludes with the passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter.Prescreening occurs when passenger names are checked against the FAA s list ofindividuals known to pose a threat to commercial aviation.On September 11,2001, there were only twelve names on the list, and none of the names of the9/11 hijackers were on it.This meant that none of the 9/11 hijackers were sub-jected to extra security measures at the airport.The hijackers did have to gothrough the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program (CAPPS) forexamination of luggage for explosives.They all passed the CAPPS inspectionbecause explosives were not part of their plot.The checkpoint screening system failed miserably on September 11, 2001.Numerous studies had noted various weaknesses in the checkpoint screeningsystem.The FAA had attempted since 1996 to set certification requirements forscreening contractors, but these requirements had not been implemented bySeptember 11, 2001.Counteracting these security efforts were FAA s instruc-tions to checkpoint supervisors to use common sense about what items shouldnot be allowed on an aircraft. This loose definition of what was allowed cre-ated confusion among the screeners.Among the items that the nineteen hijack-ers carried through thecheckpoint system were chemi-Lack of Attention to FAA s Intelligence Unit bycal sprays, utility knives, andFAA Senior Managementbox cutters.Even though util-ity knives were permissibleMoreover, the FAA s intelligence unit did not receiveunder FAA regulations, boxmuch attention from the agency s leadership.Neithercutters and chemical spraysAdministrator Jane Garvey nor her deputy routinelywere not.Several of the hijack-reviewed daily intelligence, and what they did see wasers set off alarms at securityscreened for them.She was unaware of a great amount ofcheckpoints; however, all ofhijacking threat information from her own intelligenceunit, which, in turn, was not deeply involved in the them were allowed to boardagency s policymaking process.Historically, decisive secu-their planes.rity action took place only after a disaster had occurred orTwo of the hijacked airlinersa specific plot had been discovered.had departed from LoganInternational Airport.LoganThe 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Com-International Airport had longmission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York:been known as one of the leastNorton, 2005), p.83.secure airports in the United Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 105States.As the eighteenth busiest airport in the country, it had the fifth-highestnumber of security breaches from 1991 to 2000.The Massachusetts PortAuthority (Massport) ran the airport and it had more security violations than anyother airport authority in the United States.All of this was well-known beforeSeptember 11, but nothing was done to rectify the situation.Even an April 2001memorandum from Massport s Director of Security, Joe Lawless, on the needfor Logan International Airport to address its known security vulnerabilities wasignored.Lawless had been a career law enforcement officer, who had worked asa state trooper and then provided security for former Massachusetts GovernorWilliam F.Weld.He had tried to institute mandatory criminal backgroundchecks on airline employees and subcontractors after discovering that the airlinechecks had failed to detect the criminal records of some employees.His rewardfor trying to improve security was to become a designated scapegoat for whathappened at Logan International Airport on September 11, and he was subse-quently demoted to a lower-level job.Once the 9/11 terrorists had passed through the screening process andboarded, there were no impediments to a successful hijacking [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]