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.To make the parallelbetwixt hunting and philosophy more compleat, we may observe, thattho' in both cases the end of our action may in itself be despis'd, yet inthe heat of the action we acquire such an attention to this end, that weare very uneasy under any disappointments, and are sorry when weeither miss our game, or fall into any error in our reasoning.If we want another parallel to these affections, we may consider thepassion of gaming, which affords a pleasure from the same principles ashunting and philosophy.It has been remark'd, that the pleasure ofgaming arises not from interest alone; since many leave a sure gain forthis entertainment: Neither is it deriv'd from the game alone; since thesame persons have no satisfaction, when they play for nothing: Butproceeds from both these causes united, tho' separately they have noeffect.`Tis here, as in certain chymical preparations, where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third, which is opaqueand colour'd.The interest, which we have in any game, engages our attention, withoutwhich we can have no enjoyment, either in that or in any other action.Our attention being once engag'd, the difficulty, variety, and suddenreverses of fortune, still farther interest us; and `tis from that concern oursatisfaction arises.Human life is so tiresome a scene, and men generallyare of such indolent dispositions, that whatever amuses them, tho' by apassion mixt with pain, does in the main give them a sensible pleasure.And this pleasure is here encreas'd by the nature of the objects, whichbeing sensible, and of a narrow compass, are enter'd into with facility,and are agreeable to the imagination.The same theory, that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics andalgebra.may be extended to morals, politics, natural philosophy, andother studies, where we consider not the other abstract relations of ideas,but their real connexions and existence.But beside the love ofknowledge, which displays itself in the sciences, there is a certaincuriosity implanted in human nature, which is a passion deriv'd from aquite different principle.Some people have an insatiable desire ofknowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbours, tho' theirinterest be no way concern'd in them, and they must entirely depend onothers for their information; in which case there is no room for study orapplication.Let us search for the reason of this phaenomenon.It has been prov'd at large, that the influence of belief is at once to inlivenand infix any idea in the imagination, and prevent all kind of hesitationand uncertainty about it.Both these circumstances are advantageous.Bythe vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy, and produce, tho' in a lesserdegree, the same pleasure, which arises from a moderate passion.As thevivacity of the idea gives pleasure, so its certainty prevents uneasiness, byfixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering inthe choice of its objects.`Tis a quality of human nature, which isconspicuous on many occasions, and is common both to the mind andbody, that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and thathowever any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alterationgives uneasiness.As `tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in thethought, and transport us suddenly from one idea to another, it must ofconsequence be the occasion of pain.This pain chiefly takes place, whereinterest, relation, or the greatness and novelty of any event interests us in it.`Tis not every matter of fact, of which we have a curiosity to beinform'd; neither are they such only as we have an interest to know.`Tissufficient if the idea strikes on us with such force, and concerns us sonearly, as to give us an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy.Astranger, when he arrives first at any town, may be entirely indifferentabout knowing the history and adventures of the inhabitants; but as hebecomes farther acquainted with them, and has liv'd any considerabletime among them, he acquires the same curiosity as the natives.Whenwe are reading the history of a nation, we may have an ardent desire ofclearing up any doubt or difficulty, that occurs in it; but become carelessin such researches, when the ideas of these events are, in a greatmeasure, obliterated.NOTES:1.Book I.Part I.Sect.2.2.Part II.Sec.4.3.Part II.Sect, 2,4.Part III.Sect.2.5.Part II.Sect.4.6.Book I, Part III.Sect.10.7.First Experiment.8.Second and Third Experiments9.Fourth Experiment.10.Sixth Experiment.11.Seventh and Eighth Experiments. 12.To prevent all ambiguity, I must observe, that where I oppose theimagination to the memory, I mean in general the faculty that presentsour fainter ideas.In all other places, and particularly when it is oppos'dto the understanding, I understand the same faculty, excluding only ourdemonstrative and probable reasonings.13.Book I.Part III.Sect.15.14.Mons.Rollin [Charles Rollin, Histoire Ancienne.(Paris 1730-38)].BOOK IIIOF MORALSPART IOf virtue and vice in generalSECT.IMoral distinctions not deriv'd from reasonThere is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning.that itmay silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the sameintense study to make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisitefor its invention [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.To make the parallelbetwixt hunting and philosophy more compleat, we may observe, thattho' in both cases the end of our action may in itself be despis'd, yet inthe heat of the action we acquire such an attention to this end, that weare very uneasy under any disappointments, and are sorry when weeither miss our game, or fall into any error in our reasoning.If we want another parallel to these affections, we may consider thepassion of gaming, which affords a pleasure from the same principles ashunting and philosophy.It has been remark'd, that the pleasure ofgaming arises not from interest alone; since many leave a sure gain forthis entertainment: Neither is it deriv'd from the game alone; since thesame persons have no satisfaction, when they play for nothing: Butproceeds from both these causes united, tho' separately they have noeffect.`Tis here, as in certain chymical preparations, where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third, which is opaqueand colour'd.The interest, which we have in any game, engages our attention, withoutwhich we can have no enjoyment, either in that or in any other action.Our attention being once engag'd, the difficulty, variety, and suddenreverses of fortune, still farther interest us; and `tis from that concern oursatisfaction arises.Human life is so tiresome a scene, and men generallyare of such indolent dispositions, that whatever amuses them, tho' by apassion mixt with pain, does in the main give them a sensible pleasure.And this pleasure is here encreas'd by the nature of the objects, whichbeing sensible, and of a narrow compass, are enter'd into with facility,and are agreeable to the imagination.The same theory, that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics andalgebra.may be extended to morals, politics, natural philosophy, andother studies, where we consider not the other abstract relations of ideas,but their real connexions and existence.But beside the love ofknowledge, which displays itself in the sciences, there is a certaincuriosity implanted in human nature, which is a passion deriv'd from aquite different principle.Some people have an insatiable desire ofknowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbours, tho' theirinterest be no way concern'd in them, and they must entirely depend onothers for their information; in which case there is no room for study orapplication.Let us search for the reason of this phaenomenon.It has been prov'd at large, that the influence of belief is at once to inlivenand infix any idea in the imagination, and prevent all kind of hesitationand uncertainty about it.Both these circumstances are advantageous.Bythe vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy, and produce, tho' in a lesserdegree, the same pleasure, which arises from a moderate passion.As thevivacity of the idea gives pleasure, so its certainty prevents uneasiness, byfixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering inthe choice of its objects.`Tis a quality of human nature, which isconspicuous on many occasions, and is common both to the mind andbody, that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and thathowever any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alterationgives uneasiness.As `tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in thethought, and transport us suddenly from one idea to another, it must ofconsequence be the occasion of pain.This pain chiefly takes place, whereinterest, relation, or the greatness and novelty of any event interests us in it.`Tis not every matter of fact, of which we have a curiosity to beinform'd; neither are they such only as we have an interest to know.`Tissufficient if the idea strikes on us with such force, and concerns us sonearly, as to give us an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy.Astranger, when he arrives first at any town, may be entirely indifferentabout knowing the history and adventures of the inhabitants; but as hebecomes farther acquainted with them, and has liv'd any considerabletime among them, he acquires the same curiosity as the natives.Whenwe are reading the history of a nation, we may have an ardent desire ofclearing up any doubt or difficulty, that occurs in it; but become carelessin such researches, when the ideas of these events are, in a greatmeasure, obliterated.NOTES:1.Book I.Part I.Sect.2.2.Part II.Sec.4.3.Part II.Sect, 2,4.Part III.Sect.2.5.Part II.Sect.4.6.Book I, Part III.Sect.10.7.First Experiment.8.Second and Third Experiments9.Fourth Experiment.10.Sixth Experiment.11.Seventh and Eighth Experiments. 12.To prevent all ambiguity, I must observe, that where I oppose theimagination to the memory, I mean in general the faculty that presentsour fainter ideas.In all other places, and particularly when it is oppos'dto the understanding, I understand the same faculty, excluding only ourdemonstrative and probable reasonings.13.Book I.Part III.Sect.15.14.Mons.Rollin [Charles Rollin, Histoire Ancienne.(Paris 1730-38)].BOOK IIIOF MORALSPART IOf virtue and vice in generalSECT.IMoral distinctions not deriv'd from reasonThere is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning.that itmay silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the sameintense study to make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisitefor its invention [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]